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Abstract
While policies targeting particular geographic regions are widely used by governments, there
have been few rigorous evaluations of their causal impacts. In this paper, I study the impact
of a location-based tax incentive scheme in India. Using aggregated and firm-level panel data,
I find large increases in employment, total output, fixed capital, and the number of firms
as a result of the program. These increases are due to both the growth of existing firms as
well as the entry of new firms. There is supporting evidence that the new firms entering the
treated regions are larger and more productive. I find no evidence for relocation of firms or
spillovers in industrial activity between treatment and control areas. Finally, using data from
household surveys, I show that wages of workers rise but find no changes in housing rents
or migration across the treated and control regions. My results therefore suggest that the
policy increased welfare, and I also conclude that the policy was cost-effective. This provides
support for “place-based” policies to correct for regional economic disparities, especially in
settings with low labor mobility.
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I Introduction
Many countries in the world have massive economic disparities across regions. To reduce
these regional inequalities, state and local governments often use “location-based” policies
that seek to generate employment and productivity in particular regions.1 These policies
include tax exemptions, subsidies, land grants, and other infrastructural benefits to firms in
order to incentivize them to locate to disadvantaged regions.2 The benefits and distortions
caused by these policies have long been debated by economists.3 Whether such spatially
targeted policies are able to generate economic gains in a cost-effective manner is largely an
empirical question.
The empirical evaluation of location-based policies is complicated for three reasons. First,
location-based policies are mostly directed towards underperforming regions (Neumark &
Simpson (2015)) and because of this non-random policy placement, researchers need to care-
fully choose valid control groups to make comparisons with the treated areas. Second, these
policies have both direct effects (on employment and output) and indirect effects (on local
prices and migration), which require separate analysis. Finally, spillovers and relocation of
economic activity between treated and untreated areas need to be taken in to account as
they may bias the treatment effect estimates. Detailed micro data on firms, workers, mi-
gration, and local prices is needed in order to quantify their overall effects, and such data
is often not available. This may partly explain the lack of empirical work assessing spa-
tially targeted policies, especially in developing countries. I fill this gap in the literature by
studying a place-based policy in India. Specifically, I examine the federally financed New
Industrial Policy for the states of Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh. This policy provided
tax exemptions and capital subsidies for new and existing firms starting in 2003, with the
primary aim of inducing industrialization and generating employment in the two states.
The causal effect of the 2003 policy is identified using difference-in-differences (DID) and
synthetic control methods [Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller (2010)]4. I use several different
comparison groups, with varying levels of stringency, such as all major states, neighboring
states, and bordering districts to ensure robustness in the identification strategy. To esti-
mate the treatment effect on industrial outcomes, I use both an aggregated state-industry
level dataset and a firm-level panel dataset. This allows me to look at the entry of new firms
1I use the terms location-based policies and place-based policies interchangeably.
2Some examples include Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Zones in the United States, Zones Franches
Urbaines (ZFU) in France and Regional Selective Assistance in the United Kingdom.
3Theoretical arguments can be found in Glaeser (2001), Glaeser & Gottlieb (2008), Moretti (2011), and
Kline & Moretti (2014b).
4Results for synthetic control methods are shown in the Web Supplement.
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and the growth of existing firms.
At the aggregate state-industry level, I find large increases in employment (43 percent),
number of factories (31 percent), total output (56 percent), fixed capital (71 percent), and
industrial wage bill (41 percent) in treatment states relative to control states. Although
the magnitude of the treatment effects are large, the results should be seen relative to the
low industrial base in the two treated states before the policy came into effect. In terms
of actual numbers, by 2007-08 (the last year in the data set), the policy had generated a
total of around 33000 jobs, between 550-630 factories, and approximately 8 billion rupees in
industrial wages. These results provide an estimate for the combined effect of entry of new
firms and growth of existing firms as a result of the policy change. The firm-level results
show the impact of the policy on existing firms. I find that on average, existing firms in
the treated areas increased employment5 (7.5 - 11 percent; from a mean of 39.63 employees
before the policy change), output (8.7 - 18 percent; from a mean of around 110 million rupees
before the policy change), and made additions to plant and machinery (25 - 28 percent) as
compared to firms in control states.
Although the DID regressions show a differential effect of the policy on various outcomes,
one concern is that the effects maybe driven by spillovers from the treated to the control
regions. If the policy simply causes economic activity to relocate6 from the control to the
treated areas, then the estimated treatment effect might overstate the aggregate effect of the
policy. Alternately, there could be positive spillovers due to agglomeration economies on the
nearby control areas that might lead us to underestimate the effect of the policy change. I
test for these channels explicitly by comparing outcomes in control regions located closer to
the treated states relative to regions located further away and find no differential outcomes.
I also test for differential firm closures across treated and control regions and whether multi-
plant establishments are reallocating production across plants and find no evidence for these
channels.
One economic justification for providing tax incentives to attract new firms is the possi-
bility of agglomeration economies on the existing firms in the locality [Greenstone, Hornbeck
& Moretti (2010), Kline & Moretti (2014a), Glaeser & Gottlieb (2008)]. If more productive
firms enter a location, there might be positive spillovers on existing plants, leading to overall
5Busso, Gregory & Kline (2013) find that neighborhoods receiving EZ designation experienced between
13-19 percent increase in employment.
6Place-based policies have often been criticized for simply relocating economic activity across different
locations without actually increasing aggregate output [Kline & Moretti (2014a), Glaeser & Gottlieb (2008),
Mayer, Mayneris & Py (2012)].
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growth.7 I find that the policy change attracted larger and more productive plants to enter
the treated areas. However, I do not find any differential effect on TFP (total factor produc-
tivity) for existing plants. One possible explanation for the lack of productivity spillovers
could be that the existing firms take time to internalize the agglomeration economies gen-
erated by new plants. This paper however, only studies the short-term firm-level responses
on productivity and hence might be unable to find evidence for such spillovers.
Having estimated the reduced form effects of the policy on industrial outcomes, I then
analyze the impact on the local population. This is often complicated because place-based
policies have general equilibrium effects. For instance, if workers are mobile, tax incentives
for firms to locate to a particular region might be ineffective in raising real wages of resi-
dents. The increase in labor demand by firms and the consequent rise in nominal wages for
residents might be partially or even completely offset by increases in housing rents and costs
of living as new workers move into the area [Roback (1982), Moretti (2011)]. Hence, in order
to get an estimate of the effects of the policy change on the local population, I combine data
on wages and expenditures from household surveys with data on rents, migration, and a
state-level price deflator. I find that real wages and real expenditure per capita increase (12
percent and 10 percent respectively) differentially in the treated areas, but there is no effect
on housing rents. Theoretically, this is consistent with low mobility of workers across regions,
as the increase in nominal wages following a labor demand shock is not offset by increases
in the cost of living due to entry of new workers. I explicitly test for differential migration
and find no statistically significant difference between the treated and control states. The
results on low migration in India are also consistent with previous literature.8
Finally, I conduct a back-of-the-envelope quantitative assessment using the estimates
from the paper for this location-based tax incentive scheme. I conclude that the policy
was cost-effective as the gains in profits for firms and the total wage bill for workers in the
treated states outweigh my estimates of the costs (including both actual costs of subsidies
and foregone tax revenues).9 My estimates suggest a gain of 6.5-21.3 billion rupees (102.3-
335 million USD), which is around 0.1-0.4 percent of the GDP (in 2007-08) in the two states
relative to what would have happened in the absence of it. The magnitude of these gains
seem reasonable and add credibility to the treatment effects estimated in the paper.
7For example, when the elasticity of agglomeration with respect to economic density in the receiving
region is higher, reallocating economic activity from one region to another leads to a long run increase in
output [Glaeser & Gottlieb (2008)].
8See Munshi & Rosenzweig (2009), Topalova (2010), and Hnatkovska & Lahiri (2013).
9The deadweight loss in this setting where workers are not very mobile will be low and most of the benefits
will accrue to local workers. [Busso, Gregory & Kline (2013)].
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Prior empirical work evaluating place-based policies has primarily focused on developed
countries, mostly in the United States and Europe. In the United States, the focus has been
on Federal Empowerment Zones (EZ) and State Enterprise Zones (ENTZ); these are neigh-
borhoods receiving tax breaks and job subsidies. The results on the efficacy of these zones in
creating jobs have been mixed.10 Other recent papers on place-based policies have studied
programs in European countries. These include the “Regional Selective Assistance” in the
United Kingdom [Criscuolo et al. (2012)], the French ZFUs [Mayer, Mayneris & Py (2012),
Givord, Rathelot & Sillard (2013)] and Italy’s Law 488/1992 [Bronzini & de Blasio (2006)].
My paper contributes to this growing literature by rigorously evaluating the incidence and
welfare impacts of a location-based policy in a developing country. All other papers focusing
on developing countries have studied the impact of Chinese SEZs [for example, Wang (2013),
Cheng (2014), Lu, Wang & Zhu (2015) and Alder, Shao & Zilibotti (2016)]. I extend this
relatively new literature studying location-based policies in developing countries by conduct-
ing an overall assessment of the policy change using a comprehensive set of outcomes (both
detailed industrial- and household-level). I also carry out a cost-benefit analysis of the policy
using my estimates and add to the small recent literature on local labor markets that studies
the overall costs and benefits of place-based policies [Busso, Gregory & Kline (2013), Kline
& Moretti (2014a)].
This paper also contributes to the literature on firms’ location decisions in response to
tax differentials. Duranton, Gobillon & Overman (2011) find a negative impact of local taxes
on firm employment but no impact on firm entry in the United Kingdom. Rathelot & Sillard
(2008) look at French micro data and find a weak response of firms’ location decisions to
higher taxes. In contrast, I document a large increase in the entry of firms as a result of the
tax exemptions.
The results of this paper, thus, inform policy-makers about the efficacy of tax benefits for
industrializing backward regions. In this context, I observe large responses of firms to tax
benefits, but very little migration response by individuals. This suggests that it might be
easier to provide incentives for firms to move to a particular location than to move people.
Especially in settings with low labor mobility, such spatially targeted policies could be a
cost-effective way to generate employment, output, and real earnings gains for workers.11
10Neumark & Kolko (2010), Greenbaum & Engberg (2004), and Bondonio & Greenbaum (2007) find no
effects of enterprise zones on employment growth. However, Ham et al. (2011) find positive effects for EZs,
ENTZs, and Federal Enterprise Communities. Busso, Gregory & Kline (2013) also find that the EZ program
increased employment and wages inside the zones at moderate efficiency costs.
11Kline & Moretti (2014b) also note that “..in the idealized model..the most efficient demand side subsidy
was one that yielded no mobility response at all and simply raised local wages.”
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the background for the
study and the details of the policy. Section III discusses the empirical strategy, Section IV
describes the data, and the results are discussed in Section V. Finally, Section VI conducts
a cost-benefit analysis and Section VII concludes.
II Background and Policy Details
Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand are two states in the north of India (see Figure 1).
In November 2000, the northwestern districts of Uttar Pradesh were split off to form the
state of Uttarakhand. After the formation of Uttarakhand, it was placed in the list of
“special category” states that included Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Arunachal
Pradesh, Assam, Sikkim, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Tripura. These
states get preferential treatment in terms of federal assistance. The basis on which a state
is enlisted as a “special category state” includes hilly and difficult terrain, very low level
of infrastructural development, low population density, significant tribal population, and
strategic location with borders with neighboring countries. This decision is made by the
National Development Council that comprises the Prime Minister, Union Ministers, Chief
Ministers, and members of the Planning Commission.12
Both Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh are two of the smaller states in India, together
covering roughly 3.5% of India’s total area. They are predominantly covered by hilly areas
and forests.13 According to the 2001 Census, the total population of Himachal Pradesh and
Uttarakhand was around 6.1 million and 8.5 million respectively (around 1.4% of India’s
total population). Industrialization was considered a policy challenge in the two states,
owing to the topography. For instance, in 2000, the two states together accounted for less
than 1% of the number of factories and industrial output in India. Furthermore, these
states share international borders with China and Nepal. Beginning 2003, the Government
of India (central government), in order to attract industrial investments and generate
12Note that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was the majority party in the central government in 2003,
whereas the Indian National Congress (INC) was in power in the states of Uttarakhand and Himachal
Pradesh until 2007. Thus in 2003, the Prime Minister and the Chief Ministers of the two states were from
different parties. This seems to suggest that the policy was not directed to states that had the same party
in power at the state-level as at the central level. All available sources seem to suggest that the decision to
include these states in the “special category” list was made on the basis of the guidelines mentioned in the
text.
13According to India State of Forest Report, 2011, forest area covered 66.5% of the area of Himachal
Pradesh and 64.8% of the area in Uttarakhand.
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employment in the states of Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh,14 decided to provide the
following incentive package:
I. New industrial units set up in ‘designated’ industrial estates/growth centers were en-
titled to:
(a) 100% excise duty exemption for a period of 10 years from the date of commencement
of commercial production.
(b) 100% corporate income tax exemption for an initial period of five years and thereafter
between 25-30% for a further period of five years.
(c) all new firms and existing units (upon substantial expansion) in the notified locations
would be eligible for capital investment subsidy equaling 15% of their investment in plant
and machinery, subject to a ceiling of Rs. 3 million (approximately USD 50,000).
All of these exemptions (a), (b), and (c) were available to existing industrial units de-
pending on their “substantial expansion”, i.e. if they increased the value of fixed capital
investment in plant and machinery by at least 25%.
II. A list of ‘thrust sector’ industries was compiled that would be eligible for the benefits
listed above irrespective of whether they located in an industrial estate or not.
These tax exemptions pertained to the taxes collected by the central government. In
general, companies resident in India are taxed on their worldwide income arising from all
sources at corporate income tax rates between 30% (for domestic corporations) and 40%
(for foreign corporations). Central excise duty rates varied between 8%-16%. These tax
exemptions were large enough to incentivize firms to enter the states.
The main distinction between the thrust sector industries and other industries related
to their location within the state. Essentially, to receive the incentives, a firm in a thrust
sector industry could open up anywhere in the state, whereas a firm in a non-thrust sector
industry needed to open up in a “designated” area. However, a few months after the policy
(in June 2003) was initiated, the Government of India issued a notification15 designating the
areas in the two states where industrial units (in non-thrust sectors) would be eligible to get
these tax incentives. The notification included (i) existing industrial estates (ii) proposed
industrial estates (iii) industrial activity in non-industrial area and (iv) expansion of existing
14According to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, “the objective of the scheme is to create an enabling
environment for industrial development to provide a fillip to private investment in these States. Private
entrepreneurs will be encouraged to set up more industrial units in Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand,
leading to overall growth and industrialization of these States and generation of more employment.”
15See Notification No. 50/2003 - Central Excise, Dated: June 10, 2003, available at
http://himachal.nic.in/industry/welcomelat.htm
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industrial estates. The notification through (ii), (iii) and (iv), made almost all of the existing
industrial activity prior to 2003 and surrounding areas eligible for the benefits, and also added
new areas. In practice, the notification made almost all areas where industrial activity was
possible, a “designated” area. This meant that there was virtually no differential benefit to
a firm in a thrust sector industry in these two states in terms of receiving the incentives.
The central excise tax exemption was removed on 31st March 2010, and the income tax
exemption was removed on the 31st of March 2012. Essentially, any new industrial units
set up or existing units undertaking substantial expansion in these states prior to the above
dates would continue to be eligible for these benefits.
III Empirical Strategy
In this paper, I empirically test whether the centrally sponsored location-specific tax incen-
tives led to differential increases in industrial outcomes in the treated areas as compared to
control areas. The empirical strategy uses the 2003 policy change that provided tax incentives
to firms in the two states of Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh in a difference-in-differences
setup. I use this state-year variation to compare outcomes before and after the policy change
(2003) in the treated areas to a set of control units. To the best of my knowledge, no other
policy was implemented in these two states beginning 2003 that affected industrial outcomes
differentially more or less than in other states, and this helps me to identify the treatment
effect of the particular tax incentive scheme. Many other policies such as the Electricity
Act 2003, and the Special Economic Zones Act of 2005, were national policies affecting the
entire country and should not have affected industrial outcomes in the two states differen-
tially. Furthermore, between 2003-07, there were no state assembly elections and the Indian
National Congress (INC) remained in power in both states. The national parliamentary
elections took place in 2004, and should not have resulted in differential industrial outcomes
in the two states as compared to other states.
Ideally we would like to compare the treated states to an observationally similar control
group. I consider a few different control groups for the analysis. I compare industrial out-
comes in the treated states to all major states taken together and then to a set of neighboring
states. The most stringent specification compares outcomes of firms in districts located on
either side of the borders in the treated and control areas. This is a strict test on the iden-
tification, as districts on either side of the border tend to be more similar as compared to
geographically distant locations. Finally, I also perform robustness checks using the syn-
thetic control method where the control group is formed using a weighted average of all the
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non-treated states in order to best match the treated states. For all outcome variables, the
synthetic control group comprises states both near and away from the treated states.
Indian firm-level data sets do not provide exact location identifiers (to the level of street
address and zip codes) below the district level. Since each district in the two treated states
had at least one designated area that was eligible for the incentives, an empirical strategy
comparing firms or industries across districts within the treated states would not be pos-
sible.16 Following visits to the respective state industry departments, it became clear that
the notification brought almost all existing industrial activity within the ambit of the policy
change and also added new areas. Therefore, unlike Mayer, Mayneris & Py (2012), the clos-
ing down of existing firms in ineligible areas to re-open in an eligible industrial area within
the state is not a concern here.
It is thus reasonable to consider this policy as affecting the entire states of Himachal
Pradesh and Uttarakhand. In this paper however, it will not be possible to separate out the
effects of the tax incentives from the capital subsidy provided.
Before looking at regression specifications, Figures 2 and 3 plot the raw data over time
for the variables of interest at the state-industry level. These plots show that the pre-2003
trends in employment, number of factories, total output, and fixed capital were similar across
the treated and control states, only diverging after 2003. The pre-treatment trends look par-
allel and provide visual support to the use of difference-in-differences (DID) strategy in this
context to estimate the causal effect of the policy change.17
I run two main types of regressions (DID specifications) to estimate the treatment ef-
fect of the policy change on industrial outcomes. First, I run state×3-digit industry level
regressions of the form:
ysjt = δs + λjt + β1(postt × treats) + γ1(Xst) + δst+ εsjt (1)
where s,j,t indexes state, 3-digit industry, and time respectively, ysjt represents an out-
come variable such as employment, number of factories, total output, fixed capital, or in-
dustrial wage bill that varies at the state, industry, and year level, δs represents state fixed
effects, λjt represents industry-year fixed effects, and Xst represents time-varying controls.
18
16I use the terms industrial estate and designated area interchangeably because many non-industrial areas
with existing industrial activity prior to 2003 were included as eligible areas for the policy through Notification
50/2003.
17The trends look similar even on adding all states. To be visually clear, these graphs only show the trends
in the nearby states.
18Note that in all state-industry regressions, the control group is either neighboring states or all major
states. District identifiers are not available in this dataset.
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Note that the time-varying controls include pre-treatment state-level variables from the 2001
Census such as population, number of industrial and agricultural workers, number of main
and marginal workers and number of literate people in the state, and I interact them with
a time dummy for each year. One concern with the non-random placement of the policy
(in these two states) is related to the differential pre-trends in different outcome variables
and it is possible that the observed effects are due to these pre-trends rather than the policy
itself. To address this concern, I also include state-level trends (δst) to control for differential
pre-trends in the outcome variables in different states. The coefficient β1, on the interaction
term postt × treats, where
postt =
{
1 if year is 2003 or after
0 if year is pre 2003
treats =
{
1 if state is Uttarakhand or Himachal Pradesh
0 otherwise (control states),
is then the causal effect of the policy change.19 The regressions with employment, output,
wage bill, and fixed capital therefore combine both the extensive (entry and exit of firms)
and intensive margin (growth by existing firms) of the policy change. The regression
with number of factories as the regressand gives us the extensive margin directly and is a
cumulative effect that takes into account both entry and exit of firms.
The next set of regressions are at the firm-level :
yidjt = αi + λjt + β2(postt × treatd) + γ2(Xidjt) + εidjt (2)
where i,d,j,t indexes firm, state or district (depending on choice of control group),20 4-
digit industry and time respectively, and yidjt represents a firm-level outcome variable such
as employment, output, fixed capital, additions to fixed capital, additions to plant and ma-
chinery, or wage bill. I also use age and age-squared as controls in the regressions.21 Note
that the inclusion of firm fixed effects removes the effect of new firms entering after 2003.
Hence, this regression looks at the impact of the policy change on the outcome measures
19These regressions are similar to the area level employment and number of plants regressions in Criscuolo
et al. (2012).
20For the firm-level data, district identifiers are available and thus the control groups include neighboring
states or bordering districts.
21Since a particular firm does not change location in the dataset, firm fixed effects subsume the state or
district fixed effects.
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only for incumbent firms and can be interpreted as the intensive margin of the policy change.
While the DID regressions estimate the differential effect of the policy between the treat-
ment and control areas, it is conceivable that the results are being affected by changes caused
by the policy in the control areas. For example, relocation of firms from the control states to
the treated states might lead us to wrongfully attribute the observed effects as being caused
by the policy change. To check whether firms close down in control states to reopen in the
treated states, I take three approaches. First, I look at trends in the number of operational
factories in the treated states and the neighboring control states. Then, I run a regression
at the state-industry level with the number of closed firms22 as the dependent variable to
look at the differential impact on firm closures across the treated and control states, before
and after the policy change.23 Finally, I run regressions comparing the impact of the policy
change in neighboring states to states further away from the treated states. The underly-
ing assumption is that firms closer to the treatment states would be more likely to relocate
production into those states in response to the policy. If there is substantial relocation, we
would expect to see lower industrial activity in neighboring control states relative to states
that are further away from the treated areas. Rather than closing down an existing plant in
a control area and reopening in the treated states, a multi-establishment firm might move
production between its various plants to take advantage of the tax benefits. To rule this out,
I also run regressions that omit multi-establishment firms.
A related concern might be that the policy induces spillovers in the nearby control areas.
Positive spillovers in industrial activity from the treated states to the neighboring control
states would lead us to underestimate the effect of the policy change. Such externalities
might be substantial, especially in control districts bordering the treated districts, and may
lead to a differential response on firms in districts nearer to the treated states relative to
those further away. To check whether the firm-level results are being influenced by spillovers,
I run a regression specification comparing the firms along the border in the treated states to
those in districts further away from the border in the control states (essentially omitting the
bordering control districts from the regression). I also run a specification to see the effect
of the policy change on firms in bordering control districts compared to firms in districts
further away in the control states.
Finally, to look at the effects of the policy on wages, rents, and migration, I run regres-
sions of the form:
22I define the number of closed firms as the difference between the total number of firms and the number
of operational firms.
23If firms are relocating to the treated states, we would expect to see a larger number of firm closures in
the control states as compared to the treated states.
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ykdst = δd + λt + β3(postt × treats) + γ3(Xkdst) + εkdst (3)
where k,d,s,t indexes household or individual, district, state and time respectively. ykdst
represents wages or migration status in the individual-level regressions and rents or monthly
per capita expenditure in the household-level regressions. For the individual-level regressions,
I control for age, sex, marital status, education status, and the industry of work. The
regressions with housing rents use attributes of the house as controls, such as roof type,
dwelling type, floor, number of rooms, and area.
IV Data
I combine data from multiple sources to evaluate the impact of the policy change. For
industrial outcomes, I use two datasets: (i) the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) state×3-
digit industry panel (from 2000-01 to 2007-08) and (ii) ASI firm-level panel (2000-01 to
2007-08). To study the effects on individual and household outcomes, I use (a) Employment-
Unemployment rounds of the National Sample Survey (NSS) for the years 1999-2000, 2004-
05, 2005-06 and 2007-08 and (b) Housing Conditions rounds of the NSS for the years 2002
and 2008.
The Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), conducted by the Ministry of Statistics and
Program Implementation (MoSPI), is the main source of industrial statistics in India. The
ASI covers the entire Factory Sector comprising industrial units (called factories) registered
under the Sections 2(m)(i) and 2(m)(ii) of the Factories Act, 1948. This includes all firms
employing 10 or more workers using power and 20 or more workers without the use of
power. Geographically, it covers the entire country except the states of Arunachal Pradesh,
Mizoram, and Sikkim, and Union Territory of Lakshadweep for the surveys. The ASI dataset
is well-suited to answer this question as it covers formal sector firms that are affected by tax
changes.
For the state-industry level regressions, I use the ASI state×3-digit industry panel. Each
observation is at the state-industry-year level. Industries are classified at the 3-digit National
Industrial Classification (NIC) codes. This data set includes 65 industries (3-digit NIC), 8
years (2000-01 to 2007-08) and all major states. Table 1 Panel A shows descriptive statistics
for the variables of interest at the state×3-digit industry level. As Table 1 Panel A shows, the
two treated states of Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand had smaller industrial employment,
number of factories, total output, fixed capital, and wage bill as compared to neighboring
11
states or the rest of India before 2003. For example, average employment size in a 3-digit
industry before 2003 in the treated states was 590 as compared to the figure for all the
major states together (4952). Post-2003, the average size of industrial employment goes up
throughout India, but the increase is highest in the treated states. Similar increases can be
seen for number of factories, total output, and fixed capital after 2003 in the treated states
as compared to other states. Mean total output and fixed capital at the state industry level
rises almost three-folds in the treated states after 2003, much larger than the increase in the
other states.
For the firm-level regressions, I use the ASI firm-level panel for the years 2000-01 to
2007-08. The ASI frame is divided into census (surveyed every year) and sample (sampled
every few years) sectors. However, the definition of the two sectors has changed from time
to time. Five industrially backward states24 are always covered in the census sector. For the
rest of India, the definition of the census sector has changed from 200 or more employees
(1998-2000) to 100 or more employees (2001 onwards). To take into account the changes
in the sampling frame, I run firm-level regressions using the sampling weights provided by
ASI. I restrict the sample to the major states and union territories of India as covered by
the ASI.25
“Firm” in this context means a factory, the unit of observation in the data set. Table 1
Panel B shows summary statistics for the different outcome variables at the firm-level broken
up by treated states, major states, and neighboring states for periods before and after the
policy change. I use the sampling weights from the data set to construct the summary
statistics for the estimated population.26 Average employment within the firm increases
post 2003, irrespective of which group we look at. Median employment after 2003 however,
increases by almost 56% for firms in the treated state whereas the increase is negligible for
firms in the rest of the country. Mean output and fixed capital almost double for firms in
the treated group after 2003. This increase is much larger as compared to any other group.
To study the welfare effects of the policy change, I use migration, wages, and house rents
data from the National Sample Survey (NSS). NSS is a nationally representative household
survey in India, also conducted by the MoSPI. Specifically, I use rounds 55 (1999-2000), 61
(2004-05), 62 (2005-06), and 64 (2007-08) of the employment-unemployment surveys of the
NSS for the wages data. The survey provides information on wages and employment for each
household member over the last seven days before the interview. To study migration, I use
24Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Tripura and Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
25I do not include Jammu & Kashmir or the states in the North-east namely Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya,
Nagaland, and Tripura.
26See Harrison, Martin & Nataraj (2013) and Bollard & Sharma (2013).
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NSS Rounds 55 (1999-2000) and Round 64 (2007-08)27 - one round each before and after the
policy change. The survey elicits information about the last usual place of residence for the
household members. I define an external (internal) migrant as one whose last usual place
of residence was another state or country (same state but another district). To look at the
effect of the policy on rents, I use two NSS rounds of the Housing Conditions schedule for the
years 2002 (round 58) and 2008 (round 65). These rounds include questions on housing rents
and the attributes of the house such as total floor area, kitchen type, floor type, number of
rooms, type of roof, and type of dwelling. Finally, I construct a state-level GDP deflator to
deflate nominal values using the state GDP at constant and current prices from the Reserve
Bank of India (RBI) Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy .28 Summary statistics
for these NSS data are shown in Table 1 Panel C.
V Results
I begin by reporting the results for the difference-in-differences regressions at the state-
industry level for different outcome variables (Subsection V.1) and then look at the firm-
level results (Subsection V.2). Readers interested in the synthetic control methods results
are referred to the Web Supplement of the paper. In Subsection V.3, I discuss results on
productivity and finally results on wages, rents, and migration are discussed in subsection
V.4.
V.1 State-industry results
The state-industry DID regression results are reported in Table 2. Each of the panels from
A to E, show the difference-in-difference results for the dependent variables mentioned next
to them - Log of employment (Panel A), Log of total factories (Panel B), Log of total out-
put (Panel C), Log of fixed capital (Panel D), and Log of wage bill (Panel E) in a 3-digit
industry in a particular state. Table 2 uses all the major states of India as the control
group. These include Haryana, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Chandigarh, Delhi, Rajasthan, Bi-
har, Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Goa, Kerala,
Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Jharkhand, Gujarat, and West Bengal. Similar DID regressions
with neighboring states as the control group are shown in Table Appendix A3. Neighboring
states include Haryana, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Chandigarh, and Delhi. All the results in
27Only these two rounds have information on migration for the relevant time frame.
28See Appendix Table A2.
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this subsection can be interpreted as the cumulative effect of the growth of existing firms
and the entry of new firms at the state-industry level.
In Table 2, Column 1 includes state, year, and 3-digit industry fixed effects. State fixed
effects control for time invariant state characteristics like the area and topography of the
state. The year fixed effects control for macroeconomic shocks affecting all states and the
industry fixed effects control for time invariant industry characteristics. Column 2 is a more
flexible specification as it includes industry-year fixed effects which control for time-varying
industry characteristics. This is important because some industries like pharmaceuticals and
IT (information technology) have grown in India over the last decade, and the industry-year
fixed effects controls for these changes.29 Column 3 adds time-varying controls at the state
level to the specification in Column 1. I include pre-2003 state-level variables from the
2001 Census such as population, agricultural, and industrial workers, number of main and
marginal workers and number of literate people in the state and interact them with a time
dummy for each year as control variables. Since these state-level variables were measured
before the policy came into effect, they should not have been affected by the policy. The
interaction of these state-level variables with a time dummy for each year is a flexible way
to include these as controls in the regression. Column 4 includes the specification of Column
2 with time-varying controls. Finally, to control for the possibility of differential pre-trends
in the outcome variables, I control for state-specific trends in column 5. For each regression,
standard errors are clustered at the state level. Since the policy change only affected two
states and number of state clusters are small, inference using standard cluster-robust tech-
niques may lead to over rejection. Hence, I also report the wild cluster bootstrap-t p-values
[Cameron, Gelbach & Miller (2008)] for the regressions in square brackets in the table.30
The dependent variable in Panel A is the log of employment at the 3-digit industry level.
Mean employment at the industry level differentially increases in the treated states relative
to the control states by around 43% - 45%. In columns 1 to 4, the coefficient of interest
on the interaction post*treat is positive and significant at the 1% level with standard errors
clustered at the state-level. These coefficients also remain significant at the 5% level when I
use wild cluster bootstrap-t p-values. Column 5 controls for state-specific pre-trends. The
coefficient on post*treat is smaller (34%) than in the other columns. However, the wild
cluster bootstrap-t p-values are larger (p = 0.14) making the effect statistically insignificant.
The magnitude of the treatment effect in column 5 is in the same ballpark as the coefficients
29A related concern might be that the industrial composition in the treated states is different than the
control states and to control for this, I also run regressions controlling for state×industry fixed effects and
find similar results.
30Also see Busso, Gregory & Kline (2013).
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from the other columns, and this provides evidence that the observed effects are due to the
policy change and not due to differential pre-trends. Corresponding results are shown in
Panel A in Table Appendix A3 when neighboring states are used as the control group. The
magnitudes of the treatment effect are similar and do not depend on the choice of the con-
trol group. This translates into approximately 33,000 additional jobs in the treated states in
2007-08 (the last year in the dataset) compared to what would have happened in the absence
of the policy.
Panel B looks at the same specifications for log of total number of factories as the depen-
dent variable. In this table, the coefficient on post*treat can be interpreted as the extensive
margin of the policy change as it takes into account new entry by firms as a result of the
policy change. Columns 1 through 4, show that the effect of the policy change on the average
number of factories in an industry (in treated states relative to control states) is between 31%
and 32%. The addition of state-level trends does not alter the magnitude of the treatment
effect, although the wild cluster bootstrap-t p-values are large (p = 0.221). Panel B confirms
that the policy change led to a large differential increase in the number of new firms coming
in to the treated states relative to control states. These estimates translate into a total
additional increase of 550-630 firms in the treated states in 2007-08. Table Appendix A3
Panel B shows corresponding DID results with the neighboring states as the control group.
Panel C reports the results for log of total output at the state-industry level. The ef-
fect of the policy change on total output (in treated states relative to control states) is
even larger than the effect on total employment, ranging between 56% and 64% (columns
1 through 4). State-specific trends make the output results smaller (47.3%) with the wild
cluster bootstrap-t p-value of 0.146. Results for log of fixed capital are shown in Panel D.
The results show an increase of 71% in fixed capital and part of this can be attributed to the
“substantial expansion” clause where existing firms needed to increase their investment of
fixed capital by at least 25% to receive the tax exemptions. Furthermore, capital investment
subsidies were also provided in these two states after 2003 to both new and existing firms,
contributing to the massive increase in fixed capital at the industry level. Finally in Panel
E, I show that the industrial wage bill differentially increases by 41% in the treated states as
compared to the control states. For both fixed capital and industrial wage bill, the inclusion
of state-specific trends lowers the magnitude of the treatment effect but is not substantially
different from the coefficients estimated in columns 1 through 4. Across panels A to E,
the inclusion of state-specific pre-trends does not significantly alter the magnitudes of the
treatment effects and this provides some credence to the effects of the policy change.
The estimated coefficients over time along with standard errors at the 95% confidence
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level are plotted in Figure 4. These coefficients are obtained from a regression of the out-
come variable (log employment, log factories, log output, log fixed capital, log wage bill,
and log profits) on the interaction between treat (indicator variable for treated states) and
time dummies after controlling for state, year, and industry fixed effects. Plotting these
coefficients over time is one way to test for the validity of the parallel trends assumption for
the difference-in-differences estimation. These graphs visually show that before 2003, there
were no trends in the outcomes and the effects only show up after 2003. These graphs also
provide visual evidence for the treatment effect of the policy change and show that the effect
increases every year after 2003.
There may be some concern that firms close down in the neighboring control states to
reopen in the treated states to take advantage of the tax incentives. To check for this, I take
the following steps. First, I plot the number of operational factories in the treated states
and the neighboring control states. If the policy change in 2003 caused factories to close
down in the neighboring control states and reopen in the treated states, there should be a
decline in the number of operational factories in the neighboring states. Figure 5 plots the
trends in operational factories and there is no evidence that more factories closed down in
control states compared to treated states. To check for differential closure of firms across
treated and control states, I run difference-in-differences specifications with the number of
firm closures as the dependent variable in Table 3.31 I find no differential response in terms
of firm closures across the treated and control states. In Table 4, I run regressions similar to
placebo checks. I remove the treated states from the sample and run regressions assuming
that the neighboring states got treated by the policy change. The underlying assumption
is that the relocation of factories, workers, and capital is easier from nearby places as com-
pared to regions further away from the treated states. Hence, the policy change should have
differentially impacted neighboring states as opposed to states further away from the treated
states. The results in Table 4 compare outcomes in the neighboring states to other major
states before and after the policy change. There is no statistically significant systematic
difference in the outcomes between the neighbors and all other states. Overall, there is no
evidence of differential closure of firms or relocation of industrial activity across the treated
and control states.
However, firms in control states might re-direct capital and produce output across their
different plants to take advantage of these tax incentives without closing down. To rule out
this channel completely, I would need to check whether multi-establishment firms are driving
31The number of closed firms is the difference between the total number of firms and the number of
operational firms.
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the results. I discuss this issue along with the firm-level results next.
V.2 Firm-level results
Firm-level regressions are reported in Table 5. I restrict the sample to open firms. Different
rows show the results for the various outcomes of interest. All columns, 1 through 6, include
firm, year, and 4-digit industry fixed effects. Columns 2, 4, and 6 also control for 4-digit
industry-year fixed effects. Firm fixed effects control for any time invariant unobserved
heterogeneity at the firm-level and 4-digit industry-year fixed effects take into account time-
varying effects across industries. I also control for age and age-squared in all regressions.
Columns 1 and 2 use firms in all major states as the control group. Columns 3 and 4 use
firms in neighboring states as the control group. In columns 5 and 6, I restrict the sample to
bordering districts.32 Districts on the border along the treated and control states tend to be
observationally similar, differing only because of differential benefits provided to firms. In
these specifications, I compare outcomes for firms across bordering districts (in treated and
neighboring control states) before and after the policy change. These regressions are a strict
test on the identification strategy and provide credible support to my results from using
firms in neighboring states and all major states as control groups. As mentioned earlier,
these regressions only show the effect of the policy change on existing firms. This is because
the effect of new firms entering after 2003 is removed by the inclusion of firm fixed effects.
In Table 5, the coefficients on the interaction term post*treat can be interpreted as the
intensive margin of the policy change as it shows the effect of the policy change on incumbent
firms (firms present both before and after the policy change). Columns 1 and 2 show that
the mean employment for existing firms in the treated states differentially increases by 9.4-
11.1% as compared to those in control states. In columns 3 and 4, the mean employment
rises by 7.4-10.3%. The results in columns 5 and 6 with firms in bordering districts as the
control group also shows a differential increase in mean employment in firms by around 11%.
Total output and wage bill also differentially increase for existing firms in the treated states
compared to those in control states. The differential increase in total output is between 8.7%
and 23.7% depending on the choice of the control group. Wage bill also increases by 7.3%
to 13%.
I also run regressions with fixed capital, additions to fixed capital, and additions to plant
and machinery as outcome variables. Fixed capital includes depreciation whereas additions
to fixed capital and additions to plant and machinery are measures of actual additions before
32List of bordering districts is shown in Appendix Table A1.
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depreciation. The measure of stock of fixed capital is more likely to suffer from measurement
error than the numbers for actual additions33 made during the year. This is also clear from
the regression results. For example, fixed capital shows an increase of around 5.8-8% but
in most cases is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Actual additions to fixed capital
however, increased by around 20-28% and additions to plant and machinery increased by
around 14-26% for existing firms in treated areas compared to control areas. The coefficients
from the bordering districts regressions also have similar magnitudes. These results provide
suggestive evidence that existing firms took advantage of the “substantial expansion” clause
and increased investment on fixed capital to receive the tax benefits. In this respect, these
results confirm that the policy was successful in incentivizing firms to invest more in plant and
machinery. Across all outcome variables, the coefficients of treatment effects are relatively
stable irrespective of the choice of the control group.
It is conceivable that the firm-level results are being driven by multi-establishment firms
reallocating production across their various plants to take advantage of the incentives. In
Table 6 Panel A, I directly test for this by removing multi-establishment firms from the
sample. I find similar coefficients using this sample and hence it is unlikely that the firm-
level results are being driven by these establishments. A separate concern in the bordering
districts regressions is the possibility that results are downward biased because of positive
spillovers from treated to control areas. To check for this, I run a regression specification
with the firms along the border in the treated states compared with firms further away from
the bordering districts in the control states. These results are shown in Table 6 Panel B.
For existing firms in the treated districts as compared to control districts, employment went
up by 15% and output by 16% after 2003.34 In Table 6 Panel C, I compare firms in districts
in the neighboring control states that border the treated states to firms in districts further
away from the treated states. If the policy resulted in spillovers on firms along the border
in the neighboring control states, these firms should have differential outcomes as compared
to firms away from the border in the neighboring states. I find no such differential effects
in firm-level outcomes in this regression. The results from Table 6 Panels B and C taken
together, suggest that spillovers do not play a substantial role in the firm-level results and
especially lends support for the bordering districts regression specification.
To explore differences between new and existing firms, I plot kernel density graphs (figures
6 through 8) comparing firms across treated and control regions after the policy change. The
33Actual additions are similar to measures of investment.
34These magnitudes are a bit larger than those obtained in the firm-level regressions in Table 5, suggesting
the possibility of a downward bias in the treatment effects.
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graphs clearly indicate that the new firms entering the treated states are larger and more
productive than both the existing firms (in the treated states) and the new firms entering
the neighboring control states. Since informal firms tend to be smaller in size than formal
firms, it is unlikely that the majority of the effects of the policy change are being driven by
the formalization of informal firms. However, it is not possible to say where the new firms
come from and where they might have set up in the absence of the policy.
V.3 Productivity results
A major economic rationale for providing tax incentives to firms to locate to a particular
region is the possibility of agglomeration economies. New firms entering a region might lead
to positive productivity spillovers on existing firms. To test for agglomeration economies,
I look at the differential effect of the policy change on TFP (total factor productivity)
measures in the treated states compared to the control states. I use two different measures of
productivity. First, I construct industry and firm-level TFP measures using the methodology
of Levinsohn & Petrin (2003). The gist of the method is as follows. Assume that a firm i in
industry j at time t has a Cobb-Douglas production function
yijt = α + βl(ljt) + βp(pjt) + βm(mjt) + βk(kjt) + ωijt + εijt
where y is output, l is labor, p is power and electricity expenditure, and m is expenditure
on raw materials (all variables in logarithms). The simultaneity problem arises because firms
observe their own productivity ωijt, before choosing their inputs of power, labor and other
raw materials. However, this is not observable to the econometrician. Levinsohn & Petrin
(2003) use raw material expenditure (mijt) as a proxy for the unobserved productivity shock.
They show that if these raw material inputs are monotonic in the firm’s productivity at all
levels of capital, then it can be inverted to express productivity in terms of capital and raw
materials.
ωijt = ωjt(mijt, kijt)
This function can then be inserted into the equation above. Then the estimation takes
place in two stages. In the first stage, a flexible functional form of capital and raw materials
is included and the coefficients on l and p are estimated using semi-parametric techniques.
The second stage uses GMM techniques to recover the coefficients on k and m.35 I use
35For details, see Levinsohn & Petrin (2003).
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this method to estimate production function parameters separately for each 2 digit industry.
Then, I use these estimates to construct firm-level productivity measures.
I also construct labor productivity measures defined as output per man-day and value
added per man-day. Columns 1 through 3 in Table 7 show the results for the state-industry
level DID regressions comparing aggregate productivity in the treated states to the control
states (major states). I find large increases in aggregate productivity across various measures
of TFP. This differential increase in productivity is the cumulative effect of both new and
existing firms in the treated states. A natural question to ask is whether the entry of new
firms led to increases in productivity for the existing firms. In columns 4 and 5, I run firm-
level regressions to look at the effect of the policy change on the productivity of existing
firms, and find no effects. This suggests that the most of the aggregate productivity gains in
the treated states are being driven by the entry of new firms. Although surprising, it must
be kept in mind that this paper looks only at the short to medium term effect of the policy
change and generally existing firms take some time to internalize agglomeration economies.36
These differences in productivity levels between new and old firms are also shown in Figure
8.
V.4 Wages, Rents, and Migration
After looking at various industrial outcomes, it is important to investigate changes in the
local economy. First, I test whether the policy resulted in earnings gains for the residents of
the treated states. It is conceivable that migrant workers move in from other states to take
advantage of the jobs available after the policy change. This might partially or completely
offset the nominal wage gains due to the increase in local prices and rents in the treated
states. I explicitly test for real earnings gain and differential migration across treated and
control areas. Table 8, column 1 reports the results of a difference-in-differences regression
specification comparing total wages in treated states to neighboring states. This regression
controls for district fixed effects and industry-year fixed effects along with individual controls
such as age, sex, and education status. I find an 11% differential increase in nominal wages37
for all workers in the treated states compared with the neighboring states. In column 2, I
run the same specification restricted to districts along the border and find a 13% increase
36For example,Greenstone, Hornbeck & Moretti (2010) find that the total factor productivity (TFP) of
incumbent plants grows five years after the opening of a large plant in their county. Also, Wang (2013)
shows that there is positive TFP growth more than six years after the opening of an SEZ in China.
37The wages data comes from the NSS dataset that asks each household member their wages over the
seven days preceding the interview.
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in wages. The magnitude of this effect is similar across the two specifications. Columns
3 and 4 look at wages of workers involved in non-agricultural activities and these increase
by 14.5%. In columns 5 and 6, I look at the wages of agricultural workers and find no
differential increase across the treated and control groups. This provides additional support
for the results as the policy was similar to a labor demand shock for the industrial sector
and should not have affected the agricultural sector. In columns 7 and 8, I compare housing
rents across the treated and control groups controlling for district and year fixed effects along
with housing attributes such as floor area, dwelling type, roof type, number of rooms etc. I
find no statistically significant differential effect of the policy change on housing rents. This
suggests that nominal wages might have gone up without corresponding increases in local
prices.
However, housing rents might not be an apt measure of overall price levels in India and
we would need a state-level consumer price index (CPI) to deflate the nominal values. A
state-level CPI is not readily available for different states going back to the early 2000s. I
construct an alternate price index at the state level (1999-2000 as the base year) using state
GDP at constant and current prices from the RBI Handbook of Statistics. The price index
for the neighboring states is shown in Appendix Table A2. I deflate wages and monthly per
capita expenditure and run difference-in-differences specification comparing these outcomes
in treated and control areas. In Table 9, columns 1 and 2 show that real wages increase by
12% -15%. The magnitude is similar to the increase in nominal wages in Table 8, suggesting
that the policy did not differentially affect the price levels. Furthermore, in columns 3 and 4,
I also find a differential increase in monthly per capita expenditure by around 10%.38 Finally,
for column 5, I aggregate the total wages earned in the entire states (the state-level wage
bill). I compare the total wage bill in the treated states to the neighboring control states
and find a 52.8% increase in total wage bill.39 This is comparable to the 41-44% increase in
industrial wage bill estimated in Table 2.
These results suggest that the policy change did not induce differential migration into the
treated regions from control states. I explicitly test for migration in treated areas compared
with control areas in Table 10. The definition of migrants follows the questions in the NSS
surveys that elicit information on the last usual place of residence of the respondent. Using
this measure, I define an external migrant as a person whose last usual place of residence was
another state. An internal migrant is defined as a person migrating across districts within
38In previous work analyzing place-based policies, the effects on per capita expenditure have mostly been
ignored. These results are a major improvement over what has been done in the literature thus far.
39This is the differential increase in the total wage bill over seven days.
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the state. I also run specifications with economic migrants who report that their reason for
migration is work related. I find no statistically significant effect on external migrants and
economic migrants. I find a negative differential effect on internal migrants. This might
be because each district within the treated states had an industrial estate (and more jobs)
leading to less within-state migration. Taken together, Table 10 suggests that there was
no differential migration in response to the policy change in treated states compared with
control states. This is consistent with previous literature documenting low migration in
India.40
VI Cost-Benefit Analysis
Although the results in the paper suggest that the policy was successful in creating employ-
ment, output, and real earnings gains in the treated states, it might have come at large
costs. I use the treatment effect coefficients to conduct a back-of-the-envelope cost-benefit
analysis. I broadly follow Busso, Gregory & Kline (2013) for this analysis, but in addition I
include firm profits (as a benefit of the policy).41 The benefits of the policy accrue to firm
owners, workers,42 and landowners in the treated states, whereas the costs to the government
include the foregone tax revenues and the actual cost of the capital subsidy. For the ease of
comparison, I provide all numbers in terms of 2007-08 (the last year in my analysis).
The benefits in the treated states can be broken down into three components: (i) increase
in profits of firms in the treated areas, (ii) real wage earnings increases in the treated areas,
and (iii) rental rate gains for landowners in the treated areas.
For corporate profits and income, I first estimate the treatment effect coefficient using
a state-industry level difference-in-differences specification similar to all the earlier specifi-
cations. This is shown in Table 11, where columns 1 and 2 look at the effect on corporate
profits and columns 3 and 4 show the effects on corporate income. Table 11 shows that the
policy had large effects on both corporate profits (77.5%) and income (69.5%). I use the
estimated treatment effect coefficient on post*treat in the state-industry regressions, β1, to
calculate the magnitude of the total treatment effect. For all the cost-benefit calculations I
40For example, Munshi & Rosenzweig (2009) find that in rural areas permanent migration rates of men
out of their origin villages were as low as 8.7 percent in 1999.
41Busso, Gregory & Kline (2013) measure the benefits of the EZ program as the total earnings increase
of zone workers, earnings increase for non-resident commuters, improvements in local amenities, and value
of rent reductions outside the zone due to decreases in population. They model firms as price-takers with
constant returns to scale technology. Hence, profits of firms in their analysis is zero.
42Note that in my case, migration is zero and there are no non-resident commuters.
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use the treatment effect coefficient from the difference-in-differences regression with all major
states as the control group. Note that the total treatment effect is the difference between the
actual total and the counterfactual total in 2007-08. The counterfactual total is the amount
that would have accrued in the absence of the policy and equals Actual total/(1+β1).
Similarly, for the real wage bill gains in the treated states, I use the estimates from the
total real wage bill regressions in Table 9, column 5. I multiply the weekly total wage bill
by 52 to get the yearly total wage bill. As shown in Table 8 columns 7 and 8, the rental
rates do not change differentially and hence I assume the rental rate gains to landowners
are negligible. I show the numbers in Table 12a. The total gains from the policy change are
around 95.25 billion rupees, of which 65.06 billion rupees (USD 1.01 billion) accrues to firm
owners43 (as profits) and 30.19 billion rupees (USD 480 million) accrues to workers (as wage
bill).
To calculate the costs, I take into account (i) foregone corporate income tax revenue, (ii)
foregone central excise tax revenue, and (iii) actual costs of the capital subsidy. I estimate
the foregone tax revenue by calculating the revenue that the government would have col-
lected in the absence of the policy. I use the estimated coefficient on post*treat on corporate
income (Table 11) and calculate the counterfactual.44 I use a 35% corporate income tax
rate to measure the total foregone revenue from the corporate income tax exemption. I use
the same method to calculate the foregone revenue from the central excise tax exemption.
The central excise tax is levied on the total value of output. I use the actual central excise
tax receipts collected by the Government of India as a percentage of the value of output as
the effective excise tax rate (7%).45 These numbers are shown in Table 12b. The foregone
revenues from corporate income taxes are 36.4 billion rupees and those from central excise
taxes are 29.63 billion rupees.
The actual cost of the capital subsidies is also not readily available. In this analysis, I
calculate an upper bound for the actual cost. The policy provided capital subsidies to new
and old firms equaling 15% of their investment in plant and machinery up to a maximum
amount of Rs. 3,000,000. I assume that every firm gets the maximum amount to provide
an upper bound. In 2007-08, there were 2634 firms in the treated states.46 Assuming each
firm received Rs. 3,000,000, the total amount spent by the government would be Rs. 7.9
43Around 21% of the firms in the treated states were public limited companies. Individual proprietorships
(13%), partnerships (26%) and private limited companies (38%) accounted for the bulk of the remaining
firms. No other detailed shareholder information is available in the dataset.
44Counterfactual = Actual total/(1+β).
45This figure comes from the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Report No. CA 20 of 2009-10 -
Union Government (Indirect Taxes).
46Figure from the ASI state×industry panel data.
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billion. Summing up the three components for costs, the total loss for the government was
approximately Rs. 73.9 billion (USD 1.15 billion).
Since these are public funds, they induce a direct tax burden and a marginal welfare cost
associated with acquiring the revenues. This is given by the marginal cost of public funds
(MCF). I use a value of MCF to equal 1.247 and this gives me a total cost to the government
of Rs. 88.7 billion.48 Hence, given the range of values of MCF, the cost to the government
is in the range of Rs. 73.9-88.7 billion.
Comparing the costs and benefits, gives us a range of Rs. 6.5-21.3 billion (USD 101-332
million) in benefits from the policy change. This is roughly 0.11-0.36% of the combined
GDP of the two treated states.49 One caveat of the cost-benefit calculations is that profits
to firm owners constitute a large proportion of the benefits. It is possible that the observed
profits are in fact due to a reduction in tax avoidance because of the tax exemption scheme.
If tax avoidance amounted to between 6.5-21.3 billion rupees (the net benefits of the pol-
icy), i.e. avoidance rates between 10%-33%, then the policy would have just broken even.
Although these numbers provide suggestive evidence on the cost-effectiveness of the policy,
I cannot conclude whether the policy was Pareto-improving or if the tax-incentive scheme
was the most efficient transfer to the treated regions.
VII Conclusion
Many argue that a spatially targeted industrial policy is a waste of taxpayers’ money as
it simply reallocates economic activity across regions and does not lead to overall growth.
Policy makers throughout the world however, use such location-based policies to help develop
economically lagging regions. Whether location-based tax incentives are effective and help
in industrialization and employment generation at the local level is largely an empirical
question. In the last few years, there has been a growing empirical literature on place-based
policies, mainly as more micro-data has become available. However, these policies have been
understudied in developing countries where regional economic disparities can be large and
labor mobility might be low.
In this paper, I critically examine a location-based tax incentive scheme that provided tax
exemptions and capital subsidies to new and existing firms in two states in India, beginning
47Auriol & Warlters (2012) estimate the average MCF in 38 countries in Africa to be between 1.1 and 1.2.
Browning (1976) calculated the MCF in the United States to be in the range 1.09-1.16.
48Rs. 73.9 billion × 1.2.
49Combined state GDP for Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand in 2007-08 was Rs. 598.6 billion (USD
9.6 billion).
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2003. I find that the policy change resulted in large increases in employment, output, and
capital - both due to entry of new firms and growth of existing firms. I document that the
new firms entering the treated areas are larger and more productive but find no evidence
for relocation of economic activity across the treated and control areas. The policy led to
earnings increases for residents of the treated states without any corresponding increases
in housing rents or local prices. I also show that these real earnings gain might be due
to low migration in to the treated states. Finally, I use my estimates to conduct a simple
cost-benefit analysis that suggests that the policy was cost-effective.
An important caveat is that these results are at best medium-term effects of the policy
change on various economic outcomes. It will be interesting to look at the long run impacts
of this policy after the removal of the incentives [see Kline & Moretti (2014a)]. Whether
or not such policies have a lasting impact (for example, agglomeration economies)50 or only
attract fly-by-night operators that shut shop and relocate to the next area with such benefits
is an important issue but beyond the current scope of this paper. With more data available
in the following years, this seems to be a promising avenue for future research.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Panel A: state×3-digit industry level Treated states Major states Neighboring states
N mean N mean N mean
[s.d] [s.d] [s.d]
Number employed Pre-2003 231 589.68 2746 4952.17 709 3153.96
[1214.31] [14023.84] [6118.20]
Post-2003 424 834.16 4630 5237.32 1203 3554.21
[1545.7] [14814.82] [6825.79]
Number of factories Pre-2003 231 15.98 2746 134.31 709 103.90
[27.82] [282.95] [163.59]
Post-2003 424 21.15 4630 141.98 1203 110.14
[32.17] [304.79] [188.27]
Total output Pre-2003 231 15068.07 2746 103814.2 709 73225.33
(in ‘00,000 Rs.) [26703.81] [271097.10] [128034.00]
Post-2003 424 41973.7 4630 63988.66 1203 131358.60
[94545.83] [205354.2] [256813.00]
Fixed capital Pre-2003 231 7358.37 2746 44306.31 709 24231.10
(in ‘00,000 Rs.) [20079.97] [150713.20] [57330.15]
Post-2003 424 18860.29 4630 63988.66 1203 32682.40
[61088.17] [205354.2] [79836.12]
Wage bill Pre-2003 231 1167.24 2746 6775.8 709 4166.21
(in ‘00,000 Rs.) [3509.69] [15810.68] [6912.09]
Post-2003 424 1936.53 4630 9684.05 1203 6265.78
[4662.96] [22205.34] [10883.73]
Panel B: firm-level
Number employed Pre-2003 1915 39.63 84879 41.55 18192 32.74
[151.29] [245.93] [120.00]
Post-2003 5222 43.43 176605 42.62 39710 36.03
[127.28] [202.64] [125.26]
Total output Pre-2003 1743 1097.01 80680 919.38 17234 800.43
(in ‘00,000 Rs.) [4461.96] [13874.97] [6734.20]
Post-2003 4733 2300.66 170818 1700.22 38348 1361.89
[8030.17] [33725.87] [1361.89]
Fixed capital Pre-2003 1961 471.02 87607 359.06 18741 240.86
(in ‘00,000 Rs.) [3227.43] [8383.13] [3613.18]
Post-2003 5461 928.29 185860 493.56 42523 309.13
[9743.92] [493.56] [3426.12]
Wage bill Pre-2003 1972 28.25 89306 23.05 18847 16.67
(in ‘00,000 Rs.) [264.65] [285.46] [110.60]
Post-2003 5537 31.39 190186 27.31 42922 20.74
[292.88] [344.27] [131.72]
Panel C: migration, wages, housing rents
External migrant Pre-2003 15194 0.05 499783 0.03 118045 0.04
[0.22] [0.17] [0.19]
Post-2003 16575 0.09 463736 0.03 103797 0.05
[0.28] [0.18] [0.22]
Internal migrant Pre-2003 15194 0.09 499783 0.07 118045 0.09
[0.28] [0.26] [0.28]
Post-2003 16575 0.06 463736 0.09 103797 0.09
[0.24] [0.28] [0.29]
Economic migrant Pre-2003 15194 0.10 499783 0.07 118045 0.05
[0.30] [0.26] [0.22]
Post-2003 16575 0.11 463736 0.07 103797 0.06
[0.31] [0.25] [0.23]
Total wages (in Rs.) Pre-2003 1714 879.36 75292 496.24 11772 691.05
(all workers) [861.36] [1082.62] [945.31]
Post-2003 6327 1080.16 203618 662.72 31724 829.97
[1117.18] [1517.96] [1075.31]
Housing rents Pre-2003 392 422.92 12802 596.17 2384 656.28
(in Rs.) [377.45] [807.77] [954.79]
Post-2003 511 749.74 16627 1071.5 3517 1176.71
[804.42] [1335.22] [1502.73]
Notes: Treated states: Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh; All major states: Haryana, Punjab, Delhi, Chandigarh, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan,
Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Goa, Kerala, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Jharkhand, Gujarat, and
West Bengal. Neighboring states: Haryana, Punjab, Delhi, Chandigarh, Uttar Pradesh.
Panel A: Includes summary statistics for state×3-digit-level data. Observations here are state×3-digit-year observations.
Panel B: Includes summary statistics for firm-level data. Observations here are firm-year observations.
Panel C: Includes summary statistics for migration, wages, and housing rents. External migrant is defined as a person whose last usual place
of residence is outside the state; Internal migrant is one whose last usual place of residence is the same state but a different district; Economic
migrant is one who migrated for a work related reason. Total wages are defined as the wages earned over the seven days preceding the interview.
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Table 2: State×industry results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Log employment
post*treat 0.427** 0.443** 0.439** 0.448*** 0.340
(0.0374) (0.0442) (0.0460) (0.0506) (0.0597)
[0.039] [0.031] [0.011] [0.010] [0.140]
R-squared 0.625 0.634 0.626 0.634 0.634
Panel B: Log of total factories
post*treat 0.310** 0.311** 0.315*** 0.315*** 0.320
(0.0160) (0.0170) (0.0198) (0.0191) (0.0485)
[0.008] [0.008] [0.004] [0] [0.221]
R-squared 0.715 0.719 0.716 0.719 0.719
Panel C: Log of total output
post*treat 0.561** 0.577* 0.623** 0.639** 0.473
(0.0408) (0.0475) (0.0463) (0.0497) (0.146)
[0.036] [0.067] [0.041] [0.033] [0.154]
R-squared 0.611 0.622 0.611 0.622 0.622
Panel D: Log of fixed capital
post*treat 0.711 0.728 0.776** 0.787** 0.564
(0.0871) (0.0734) (0.0840) (0.0713) (0.197)
[0.182] [0.211] [0.026] [0.034] [0.176]
R-squared 0.627 0.635 0.628 0.636 0.635
Panel E: Log of wage bill
post*treat 0.412* 0.427* 0.437** 0.449** 0.253
(0.0724) (0.0900) (0.0794) (0.0948) (0.0672)
[0.053] [0.070] [0.050] [0.031] [0.197]
R-squared 0.604 0.611 0.604 0.612 0.612
Observations 8,028 8,028 8,028 8,028 8,028
state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 digit industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 digit industry-year FE No Yes No Yes Yes
time-varying controls No No Yes Yes No
state level pre-trends No No No No Yes
control group Major states Major states Major states Major states Major states
Notes: The coefficient on the interaction term post*treat shows the treatment effect. Time varying controls include pre-
treatment state-level variables (population, number of agricultural workers, number of industrial workers, number of main and
marginal workers and number of illiterate people) interacted with a time dummy for each year. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the state level. Square brackets show p-values that are calculated using the Cameron, Gelbach & Miller (2008)
wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure (999 replications). ***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%.
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Table 3: Number of firm closures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
closed closed closed closed
post*treat 0.0487 0.311 0.469 -0.377
(0.397) (0.330) (0.387) (0.319)
Observations 2,567 2,567 8,031 8,031
R-squared 0.312 0.321 0.275 0.277
state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 digit industry-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
time-varying controls No Yes No Yes
Control Group Neighboring Neighboring Major states Major states
states states
Notes: Dependent variable is the number of firm closures in a 3-digit industry in a particular state. The coefficient on
the interaction term post*treat shows the treatment effect. Time varying controls include pre-treatment state-level variables
(population, number of agricultural workers, number of industrial workers, number of main and marginal workers and number
of illiterate people) interacted with a time dummy for each year. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level.
***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%.
Table 4: Testing for relocation of industrial activity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log (employed) Log (total factories) Log (total output) Log (fixed capital) Log (wage bill)
post*neighbors 0.0501 0.00974 -0.0371 -0.0273 0.0288
(0.0449) (0.0245) (0.0639) (0.00541) (0.0513)
Observations 7,375 7,375 7,375 7,375 7,375
R-squared 0.629 0.716 0.621 0.635 0.607
state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 digit industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The coefficient on the interaction term post*neighbors shows the effect of the policy change on neighboring states as
compared to all other major states (excluding the neighboring states). The two treated states are omitted in this regression.
Standard errors are clustered at the state level. ***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%.
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Table 5: Firm-level regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log (employed)
post*treat 0.0944** 0.111** 0.0747* 0.103*** 0.0740 0.110*
(0.0382) (0.0450) (0.0400) (0.0377) (0.0577) (0.0544)
Observations 262,458 262,458 63,629 63,629 13,185 13,185
R-squared 0.945 0.946 0.939 0.942 0.946 0.953
Log (total output)
post*treat 0.0940* 0.113* 0.0866 0.114** 0.177** 0.237***
(0.0511) (0.0685) (0.0538) (0.0484) (0.0711) (0.0722)
Observations 251,767 251,767 60,664 60,664 12,315 12,315
R-squared 0.964 0.965 0.965 0.967 0.970 0.976
Log (wage bill)
post*treat 0.0733** 0.0930** 0.0807** 0.113** 0.108** 0.129**
(0.0341) (0.0393) (0.0359) (0.0365) (0.0466) (0.0565)
Observations 262,516 262,516 63,650 63,650 13,193 13,193
R-squared 0.955 0.956 0.949 0.952 0.954 0.960
Log (fixed capital)
post*treat 0.0579* 0.0756** 0.0552 0.0709** 0.0804 0.0812
(0.0313) (0.0293) (0.0341) (0.0304) (0.0501) (0.0495)
Observations 273,830 273,830 67,033 67,033 14,125 14,125
R-squared 0.969 0.970 0.973 0.974 0.978 0.981
Log (additions to fixed capital)
post*treat 0.200*** 0.235*** 0.278*** 0.275*** 0.277 0.406**
(0.0681) (0.0686) (0.0772) (0.0687) (0.170) (0.154)
Observations 201,697 201,697 52,906 52,906 10,503 10,503
R-squared 0.868 0.871 0.856 0.864 0.875 0.899
Log (additions to plant and machinery)
post*treat 0.144** 0.140** 0.255*** 0.256*** 0.199* 0.246
(0.0674) (0.0681) (0.0833) (0.0911) (0.113) (0.216)
Observations 159,338 159,338 41,674 41,674 8,222 8,222
R-squared 0.862 0.867 0.858 0.869 0.883 0.914
Control group Major Major Neighboring Neighboring Border Border
states states states states districts districts
firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
4-digit industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
4-digit industry year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Age Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The coefficient on the interaction term post*treat shows the treatment effect. Standard errors are clustered at the
district level. ***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%.
31
Table 6: Testing for spillovers in firm-level regressions
(1) (2) (3)
Log (employed) Log (total output) Log (fixed capital)
Panel A: removing multi-establishment firms
post*treat 0.0919** 0.144*** 0.0656*
(0.0437) (0.0476) (0.0383)
Observations 55,599 52,682 58,796
R-squared 0.939 0.969 0.973
Panel B: testing for spillovers 1
post*treat 0.151*** 0.162** 0.0388
(0.0535) (0.0698) (0.0628)
Observations 17,456 16,316 18,139
R-squared 0.958 0.975 0.978
Panel C: testing for spillovers 2
post*neighboring-district 0.0575 -0.128 -0.0749
(0.0579) (0.0799) (0.0808)
Observations 17,451 16,679 18,708
R-squared 0.955 0.979 0.978
firm FE Yes Yes Yes
4-digit industry-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Age Controls Yes Yes Yes
Notes:
Panel A: This regression removes multi-establishment firms and runs a difference-in-differences regression.
Panel B: This regression compares firms along the border in the treated states to firms away from the border in the neighboring
control states.The coefficient on the interaction term post*treat shows the treatment effect.
Panel C: This regression compares firms along the border in the neighboring control states to firms away from the border in
the neighboring control states.The coefficient on the interaction term post*neighboring-district shows the treatment effect.
Standard errors are clustered at the district level. ***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%.
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Table 7: Productivity regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log (TFP) Log (labor productivity 1) Log (labor productivity 2) Log (labor productivity) Log (TFP)
(Levinsohn-Petrin) (Value added / man-days) (Total output/man-days) (Total output/man-days) (Levinsohn-Petrin)
post*treat 0.240** 0.294*** 0.133*** -0.0372 -0.0329
(0.0983) (0.0686) (0.0266) (0.0911) (0.0380)
Observations 7,702 7,754 7,863 192,539 238,673
R-squared 0.632 0.389 0.518 0.943 0.862
state FE Yes Yes Yes - -
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 digit industry FE Yes Yes Yes - -
firm FE No No No Yes Yes
4-digit industry year FE No No No Yes Yes
Age Controls No No No Yes Yes
Notes: The coefficient on the interaction term post*treat shows the treatment effect. Columns 1 through 3 show state-industry
regressions with major states as the control group. Columns 4 and 5 show firm-level regressions with major states as the control
group. Firm fixed effects subsume state fixed effects. Standard errors for columns 1-3 are clustered at the state level, and at
the district level for columns 4 and 5 . ***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%.
Table 8: Nominal wages and Rents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log (wages) Log (wages) Log (wages) Log (wages) Log (wages) Log (wages) Log (rent) Log (rent)
[all] [all] [non-agricultural] [non-agricultural] [agricultural] [agricultural] [all] [all]
post*treat 0.111** 0.132* 0.147*** 0.145* 0.0215 -0.0273 0.396 -0.0583
(0.0531) (0.0640) (0.0561) (0.0714) (0.135) (0.189) (0.266) (0.313)
Observations 51,455 10,189 40,964 8,387 10,491 1,802 3,500 603
R-squared 0.667 0.615 0.642 0.660 0.433 0.239 0.540 0.451
district FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
industry-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
control group Neighboring Bordering Neighboring Bordering Neighboring Bordering Neighboring Bordering
states districts states districts states districts states districts
Notes: The coefficient on the interaction term post*treat shows the treatment effect. Controls for columns 1 through 6 include
age, sex, educational status, marital status and relationship to household head. Controls for columns 7 and 8 include attributes
of the house such as number of rooms, kitchen type, dwelling type, roof type and floor type. Standard errors are clustered at
the district level. ***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%.
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Table 9: Real wages and real monthly per capita expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log (real wages) Log (real wages) Log (real MPCE) Log (real MPCE) Log (real wage bill)
post*treat 0.122** 0.146** 0.0967** 0.107 0.528***
(0.0495) (0.0616) (0.0408) (0.0739) (0.168)
Observations 51,455 10,189 88,731 17,157 531
R-squared 0.668 0.605 0.358 0.243 0.287
district FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
industry-year FE Yes Yes No No No
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes No
control group Neighboring states Bordering districts Neighboring states Bordering districts Neighboring states
Notes: The coefficient on the interaction term post*treat shows the treatment effect. Controls for columns 1 and 2 include age,
sex, educational status, marital status and relationship to household head. Controls for columns 3 and 4 include household type,
social group, rural-urban and religion. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. ***Significant at 1%, **significant at
5%, *significant at 10%.
Table 10: Testing for differential migration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
external migrant external migrant internal migrant internal migrant economic migrant economic migrant
post*treat 0.0172 0.0396 -0.0252** -0.0236 0.00486 0.0349
(0.0272) (0.0412) (0.0120) (0.0173) (0.0244) (0.0311)
Observations 253,611 45,301 253,611 45,301 253,611 45,301
R-squared 0.087 0.043 0.031 0.017 0.076 0.026
district FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control group Neighboring states Bordering districts Neighboring states Bordering districts Neighboring states Bordering districts
Notes: The coefficient on the interaction term post*treat shows the treatment effect. External migrant is one whose last
usual place of residence was another state or country. Internal migrant’s last usual place of residence was the same state but
another district. An economic migrant migrated for work related reasons. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%.
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Table 11: Corporate profits and corporate income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log (profit) Log (profit) Log (income) Log (income)
post*treat 0.930*** 0.775*** 0.775*** 0.695***
(0.241) (0.205) (0.104) (0.0687)
Observations 2,021 6,032 2,404 7,440
R-squared 0.559 0.512 0.582 0.543
state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 digit industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
control states Neighboring states Major states Neighboring states Major states
Notes: The coefficient on the interaction term post*treat shows the treatment effect. Standard errors are clustered at the state
level. ***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%.
Table 12a: Total Benefits
Actual Total in 2007-08 Treatment effect Total impact in 2007-08
(billion rupees) coefficient (in billion rupees)
profits 148.85 0.775 65.06
total wage bill 87.36 0.528 30.19
Table 12b: Total Costs
Actual Total in 2007-08 Treatment effect Counterfactual Tax rate Loss in revenue
(in billion rupees) coefficient (in billion rupees) (percent) (in billion rupees)
corporate income 176.31 0.695 104.02 35 36.40
total output 660.75 0.561 423.29 7 29.63
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Figure 1: Map of India
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Figure 2: Trends in employment and number of factories
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Notes: ASI state×industry data from 2000-01 to 2007-08.
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Figure 3: Trends in total output and fixed capital
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Notes: ASI state×industry data from 2000-01 to 2007-08.
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Figure 4: Estimated coefficient graphs
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Notes: These graphs plot the coefficients obtained from a regression of the outcome variable (mentioned on
top of the graph) on the interaction between the treated states dummy and year dummies. The regressions
control for state, year, and 3-digit industry fixed effects. The Y-axis shows the estimated coefficients and
the X-axis shows the various years. The control group here is all major states. Standard errors are clustered
at the state level.
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Figure 5: Trends in operational factories
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Notes: ASI state×industry data from 2000-01 to 2007-08.
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Figure 6: Kernel density of Log (employed)
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Notes: ASI firm-level data from 2000-01 to 2007-08.
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Figure 7: Kernel density of Log (total output)
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Notes: ASI firm-level data from 2000-01 to 2007-08.
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Figure 8: Kernel density of Log (TFP-Levinsohn-Petrin)
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Notes: ASI firm-level data from 2000-01 to 2007-08.
Appendix
Table A1: List of bordering districts
Himachal Pradesh Uttarakhand Uttar Pradesh Haryana Punjab
Sirmaur Udham Singh Nagar Pilibhit Yamunanagar Pathankot
Solan Nainital Bareilly Ambala Hoshiarpur
Bilaspur Pauri Rampur Panchkula Rupnagar
Una Haridwar Moradabad - SAS Nagar
Kangra Dehradun Bijnor - Gurdaspur
Chamba - Muzzafarnagar - -
- - Saharanpur - -
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Table A2: State-level price index for neighboring states
States 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08
Himachal Pradesh 1.00 1.04 1.09 1.15 1.16 1.19 1.23 1.26 1.30
Uttarakhand 1.00 1.02 1.06 1.13 1.16 1.18 1.25 1.35 1.42
Haryana 1.00 1.05 1.09 1.14 1.18 1.23 1.28 1.36 1.49
Punjab 1.00 1.07 1.11 1.13 1.15 1.18 1.25 1.33 1.47
Uttar Pradesh 1.00 1.01 1.03 1.09 1.13 1.17 1.24 1.32 1.40
Chandigarh 1.00 1.03 1.09 1.14 1.19 1.28 1.39 1.46 1.51
Delhi 1.00 1.04 1.09 1.11 1.17 1.21 1.26 1.32 1.38
Notes: These deflators have been calculated using the state GDP at current and constant prices from the RBI Handbook of
Statistics on the Indian Economy. Base year: 1999-2000.
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Table A3: State×industry results for neighboring states
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Log employment
post*treat 0.371*** 0.418 0.372 0.257
(0.0414) (0.0371) (0.0416) (0.119)
[0] [0.205] [0.192] [0.181]
R-squared 0.688 0.691 0.712 0.710
Panel B: Log of total factories
post*treat 0.268*** 0.291 0.270 0.253
(0.0192) (0.0311) (0.0363) (0.0777)
[0.009] [0.128] [0.113] [0.131]
R-squared 0.725 0.727 0.738 0.736
Panel C: Log of total output
post*treat 0.579*** 0.619 0.566 0.465
(0.0500) (0.0433) (0.0606) (0.211)
[0] [0.162] [0.178] [0.152]
R-squared 0.655 0.658 0.682 0.679
Panel D: Log of fixed capital
post*treat 0.718*** 0.878 0.866 0.625
(0.0894) (0.0538) (0.0638) (0.195)
[0.004] [0.183] [0.157] [0.123]
R-squared 0.668 0.672 0.695 0.691
Panel E: Log of wage bill
post*treat 0.392* 0.322 0.275 0.271
(0.0795) (0.0514) (0.0547) (0.123)
[0.066] [0.199] [0.157] [0.179]
R-squared 0.660 0.663 0.685 0.683
Observations 2,567 2,567 2,567 2,567
state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 digit industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 digit industry-year FE No No Yes Yes
time-varying controls No Yes Yes No
state level pre-trends No No No Yes
control group Neighboring states Neighboring states Neighboring states Neighboring states
Notes: The coefficient on the interaction term post*treat shows the treatment effect. Time varying controls include pre-
treatment state-level variables (population, number of agricultural workers, number of industrial workers, number of main and
marginal workers and number of illiterate people) interacted with a time dummy for each year. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the state level. Square brackets show p-values that are calculated using the Cameron, Gelbach & Miller (2008)
wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure (999 replications). ***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%.
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